







2, Rodolfo M. NAYGA, Jr





1Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna,
 2Agricultural University of Athens 
3University of Arkansas,  
4Alma Mater   Studiorum - Università di Bologna 












Paper prepared for presentation at the 120
th EAAE Seminar ‘External Cost of Farming 
Activities: Economic Valuation, Risk Considerations, Environmental Repercussions and 
Regulatory Framework’,  
Chania, Crete, Greece, September 2















Copyright 2010 by Vincenzina Caputo, Achilleas Vassilopoulos,  Rodolfo M. Nayga, Jr., and 
Maurizio Canavari.  All rights reserved. Readers may make verbatim copies of this document 
for non-commercial purposes by any means, provided that this copyright notice appears on all 
such copies.  
 
1 
Welfare Effects of Food Miles Labels 
 
Vincenzina  Caputo
1,  Achilleas  Vassilopoulos
2,  Rodolfo  M.  Nayga,  Jr




1Alma  Mater  Studiorum  -  Università  di  Bologna, 
2Agricultural  University  of 
Athens, 
3University of Arkansas, 
4Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna.   




We assessed the consumer welfare effects of two generic food miles labels: 
carbon dioxide (CO2) emission label and number of miles label. Using data 
from a choice experiment, our results generally suggest that a mandatory 
labeling policy for either type of label would have a positive welfare effect 
on both informed and uninformed consumers.  However, a label informing 
consumers  about  the  number  of  miles  the  food  product  has  travelled 
provides greater positive welfare effects than a label informing consumers 
about the amount of CO2 emission. 
 
Keywords:  welfare  effect,  generic  food  miles  labelling  programs,  choice 
experiment, Italy.  
 
1.  Introduction 
 
“Food  miles”  is  a  term  coined  in  a  1994  Report  (Paxton,  1994)  by  the 
Sustainable Agriculture Food and Environment (SAFE) Alliance to indicate 
the distance food travels from the time it was produced until it reaches the 
consumers. Several studies that have focused on food miles have estimated 
the environmental effect of the transportation of food products around the 
world (Smith et al., 2005; Pretty et al., 2005; Weber and Matthews, 2008), 
as well as the differences in environmental impact of domestic and imported 
food products (Pirog et al., 2001; Jones, 2002).  
The issue about the environmental effects of food miles is however still 
under debate in the scientific literature. Many studies focused on food miles 
and on the effect of food transportation on the environment report mixed 
results  and  do  not  provide  empirical  evidence  on  whether  domestic  or 
imported  food  products  generate  a  greater  environmental  impact.  For 
example, Blanke and Burdick (2005) compared the energy cost of locally-
grown  and  controlled  atmosphere  stored  German  apples  versus  apples 
imported from New Zealand. The authors calculated the „primary energy  
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requirement‟  in  delivering  apples  from  these  two  sources  to  German 
consumers. They conclude that the local apples were indeed more energy-
efficient although the difference was relatively modest (i.e., 5893 MJ/tonne 
German apples vs. 7499 MJ/tonne for New Zealand apples). On the other 
hand,  Carlsson  (1997)  performed  an  analysis  of  energy  consumption  of 
tomatoes in retail outlets in Sweden. He concluded that it was actually far 
better for the environment to purchase imported outdoor tomatoes from the 
Canary  Islands  during  the  winter  than  to  purchase  hothouse-grown  local 
tomatoes. Despite the current debate on whether domestic or imported food 
product  is  more  sustainable,  the  “food  miles”  concept  can  be  used  as  a 
quality  cue  of  a  food  product  since  it  informs  consumers  about  the 
environmental  impact  and  the  distance  travelled  by  the  food  they  eat.  
Basically, information about “food miles” could include information about 
the amount of carbon dioxide (CO2) emitted during the transportation of the 
food products or the number of kilometers that the food travelled. Thus, the 
implementation of a food miles labeling system could provide information 
that  can  help  consumers  make  informed  purchasing  and  consumption 
decisions.    
 
The distance that food travels might have important implications in terms of 
the social, economic, and environmental sustainability of the food system. 
For this reason, food miles is now becoming a concept of interest for both 
consumers  and  policy  makers.  From  a  consumer‟s  point  of  view,  the 
introduction  of  food  miles  labeling  could  reduce  the  asymmetry  of 
information between consumers and producers as well as increase the utility 
of consuming products that carry such labels especially for consumers with 
higher sustainability/environmental concerns. For policy making, food miles 
labels  can  be  used  as  an  incentive  to  promote  the  sustainable 
production/consumption of food products in accordance with international 
trends.  
The purpose of our study is to calculate the consumer welfare effects of a 
mandatory food miles labeling policy. With the implementation of a food 
miles labeling program, it is possible that unlabeled products will become 
unavailable and thus  consumers  will have to  turn to  labeled products  or 
withdraw from the market. Calculating the welfare effects of  food miles 
(FM) labels is important since this information can help policy makers make 
informed  decisions  on  whether  to  develop  and  implement  mandatory 
labeling policies related to food miles.   
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2.  Background  
 
In past studies, welfare effects estimation of food policies were carried out 
using consumer demand data and the application of different methods such 
as discrete choice method (Hu et al., 2005; Lusk et al., 2006), individual 
WTP method (Lusk et al., 2005; and Rousu et al., 2007), and the average 
WTP method
1 (Marette et al., 2008a, 2008b) or from a combination of them 
(Lusk and Marette, 2010).   
 
In all of these applications, the authors evaluated the change in consumers‟ 
welfare associated with different policy instruments, related to the presence 
or the absence of particular information on the food product available in the 
market.  
 
In the case of the discrete choice method, the parameters are obtained from a 
discrete choice model where the probability of purchase is conditional on 
price  and  other  attributes  of  the  food  products  of  interest.    Only  a  few 
studies,  however,  have  attempted  to  calculate  consumer  welfare  effects 
using  this  method.  For  example,  Hu  et  al.  (2005),  analyzed  consumers‟ 
preferences for prepackaged sliced bread with genetically-modified (GM) 
ingredients under two labeling policies: mandatory labeling and voluntary 
labeling. They focused on how the two different labeling schemes affect 
consumers‟ choices and on the possible welfare implications of these two 
labeling policies. Their findings suggest that the magnitude of consumers‟ 
welfare increased with the mandatory labeling  policy and as more bread 
products were covered by the labeling policy. In particular, the magnitude 
(absolute value) of the loss in consumer welfare associated with the “GM 
attribute”  was  consistently  larger  than  the  absolute  value  of  the  welfare 
increases associated with the “non-GM” attribute.  
 
Lusk et al. (2006), estimated the direct and indirect benefits of a ban on 
feeding subtherapeutic antibiotics in pork production among a sample of 
grocery  shoppers  in  Oklahoma.  Their  results  indicated  that  the  welfare 
effects of a ban depend heavily on assumptions about consumers‟ current 
                                                            
 
1 The difference between the individual WTP method and the average WTP method is that with the former, the 
allocation of each respondent along the distribution of the parameters is done by taking into account the additional 
information available on the alternative chosen, while with the later respondents are randomly assigned along the 
continuous distribution of the parameters. For details see Hensher, Greene and Rose (2003).  
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knowledge about antibiotic use in pork production and the extent to which 
consumers are currently able to purchase antibiotic-free pork.  
 
Finally,  Lusk  and  Marette  (2010)  estimated  the  welfare  effects  of  food 
labels and bans on beef cloning and methylmercury in fish by combining 
discrete  choice methods with other alternative willingness to pay (WTP) 
measures such as individual WTP and average WTP. They compared each 
value elicitation approach in terms of the consumer surplus changes that 
resulted  from  these  two  regulations  related  to  beef  cloning  and 
methylmercury in  fish.  Their findings suggest  that  the  while the sign  of 
welfare  measures  was  invariant  across  the  three  methods  used,  the 
magnitude  of  these  welfare  measures  varied  significantly  across  these 
methods.   
 
We are not aware of any other study that has evaluated consumer welfare 
effects of food miles labeling. 
3.  Objectives  
 
The aim of this study is twofold: (1) to test if the presence of two different 
food miles labels affects consumer choice, using a choice experiment (CE) 
approach,  and  (2)  to  calculate  the  welfare  effects  of  mandatory  labeling 
policy related to these two types of food miles information: CO2 emission 
(CO2) and number of miles (nmiles) travelled by the food product.    
4.  Data and Methodology 
 
4.1  Data collection and survey instrument  
 
The  data  used  in  this  article  are  drawn  from  responses  to  a  survey 
instrument administered to 200 consumers during spring 2009 in Naples, 
Italy. Adult food shoppers (at least 18 years old) were randomly selected in 
three different grocery stores.  The questionnaire was administered face to 
face by trained interviewers who conducted the survey in grocery stores at 
different days of the week and different times of the day. The interviewers 
asked the randomly selected individuals two screening questions related to 
whether  they  were  the  main  household  food  shopper  and  whether  they 
consumed fresh tomato. If the response to both questions was yes, then the  
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individual  was  interviewed  for  the  choice  experiment  (CE).  The 
questionnaire  included  the  CE  questions  on  fresh  tomatoes  and  other 
questions  regarding  sustainable  and  organic  consumption,  purchase  and 
consumption habits of fresh tomato, and socio-demographics characteristics.  
In the CE section of the survey, people were asked to answer a series of 
discrete choice questions regarding which of the two fresh tomato profiles 
(with  a    “none”  option)  they  would  buy  when  grocery  shopping.  In 
particular, in each fresh tomato profile option, two types of generic food 
miles labels were considered: one which would provide information about 
the  distance  and  time  the  food  traveled  and  one  which  would  provide 
information on the amount of CO2 emission from the transportation.  The 
other attributes included in the CE design are price (with values 1.1, 2.1, 
3.1,  4.1  EUR),  type  of  tomato  (cherry,  plum  and  brief)  and  method  of 
production (organic, conventional).  
To determine which fresh tomato profiles to present to respondents, we used 
an orthogonal design for “main effects” to reduce the 72 (4x2x3
2) possible 
combinations  of  attributes  and  levels  into  32  pair-wise  comparisons  of 
alternative fresh tomato scenarios, which were then randomly grouped into 
pairs and split into four different blocks of 8 choice sets, erasing one card 
from each block due to repetition of some combinations. Prior to the choice 
question, the choice experiment was explained to the participants including 
information about the fresh product attributes and their levels. We also told 
them  to  assume  that  the  product  profiles  have  identical  environmental 
impact in terms of their production and transportation. Finally, given the 
hypothetical  nature  of  our  investigation  and  the  possible  presence  of 
hypothetical bias related with this type of studies, we included, following 
Silva et al. (2009), a cheap talk in all questionnaires right before the choice 
questions to minimize possible hypothetical bias from the responses.  
4.2  Data analysis 
 
The choice questions were analyzed using the random utility framework. 
Thus, the final specification of the utility function is assumed to depend on 
the attributes and attribute levels considered in the choice questions. The 
utility that individual i obtains from alternative j at choice situation t is:           
(1)                                                                      




Where I is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for the no-choice (none) 
option and 0 otherwise, price is the price of one kilogram of fresh tomato, 
while  the  rest  of  the  attributes  enter  the  model  as  either  an  effect  code 
(method) or dummy code (types of tomatoes and food miles attributes). In 
particular, the production method attribute is coded with a value of +1 if 
production method in option j is organic, and -1 if the production method in 
option j in choice situation t is conventional; whereas cherry, plum, nmiles, 
and CO2 are coded as dummy variables that take the value of 1 if they are 
true for option j in choice situation t and 0 otherwise. 
 
We analyzed the data using the Random Parameter Logit model (RPL) since 
it allows for possible heterogeneous preferences across consumers and does 
not assume that irrelevant alternatives are independent. As shown by Train 
(2003),  the  probability  that  an  individual  i  chooses  alternative  j,  is 
represented as:   













For the maximum likelihood estimation, the conditional probability of the 
sequence of choices made by each respondent is obtained according to the 
following expression (Train, 2003): 
 
(3)  i t i ij
t
i i P S   ) , ( ) (  
 
 
where ij(i,t) represents the alternative chosen by person i in choice occasion 
t.  Because  βi  is  assumed  to  be  a  random  parameter  varying  across 
respondents, the random logit probability can be derived by integrating the 
probability over all values of β 
 
(4)  i i i i i d f S P      ) ( ) ( ) (  
 
 
Because equation (9) lacks a closed form solution, the parameters of the 
model are estimated by simulated maximum likelihood estimation technique 
following Train (2003). As in Revelt and Train (1998), we assume that the 
price coefficients are invariant across individuals and that the coefficients of 
the other attributes and levels of the attributes are random parameters with a  
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normal distribution. For the estimation of the RPL model, 500 Halton draws 
rather  than  random  draws  are  used  since  the  former  provides  a  more 
efficient simulation for this model. 
 
The  fact  that  random  utility  theory  is  based  on  the  assumption  that 
consumers  derive  utility  from  consumption  of  good  according  to  their 
attributes  permits  a  theoretically  sound  transformation  of  parameter 
estimates of each attribute into WTP measures for specific product quality 
characteristics.  
4.3.  Policy simulation 
 
Using  the  results  from  our  CE  we  attempt  to  estimate  the  effect  that  a 
mandatory food miles labeling policy would have on consumers‟ welfare. 
To accomplish this, one has to consider the corresponding changes that a 
food  miles  policy  would  enforce  on  consumers.  When  the  change  in 
situation is purely the introduction of a labeling policy, the actual attributes 
or qualities under consideration are exactly the same before and after the 
application  of  the  policy  (Hu  et  al.,  2005).  Thus,  changes  in  attributes 
caused  by  the  introduction  of  food  miles  labeling  in  the  market  are  a 
reflection of changes in the amount of consumer information. According to 
Lusk (2010), the new product can be perceived by consumers as being of 
higher quality compared to what has traditionally been sold in the market 
(e.g., organic) or it can be perceived by consumers as being of lower quality 
than what has traditionally been sold (e.g., genetically modified, etc).  From 
our CE estimates, we found that the two food miles labels we considered 
both  have  a  positive  impact  on  the  utility  function  (i.e.,  with  positive 
coefficients).  Hence, we expect these food miles labels to provide consumer 
welfare benefits. 
 
For  a  better  understanding  of  the  market  dynamics,  following  Lusk  and 
Marette  (2010),  we  shall  consider  two  extreme  situations:  one  in  which 
consumers are fully aware of the change in product quality introduced by 
the food miles labels due to the reduction in information asymmetry (i.e., 
this group will be called “informed consumers” hereafter) and one in which 
consumers  notice  no  difference  in  product  quality  between  labeled  and 
unlabelled products (i.e., “uninformed consumers” group). In the first case, 
the demand curve shifts following consumers‟ change in preferences while 
in the latter case, the food miles labels are unnoticeable or non-sensible to  
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the consumers; thus consumers simply move along the demand curve. For 
this  reason,  to  fully  characterize  the  welfare  effect  of  the  policy  on 
consumers,  one  has  to  examine  the  (perceived)  choices  consumers  are 
undertaking  before  and  after  the  mandatory  labeling  scheme  in  the  two 
aforementioned  cases.  Additionally,  we  assume  that  producers  are 
characterized by perfectly elastic supply curves with production functions 
represented by constant returns to scale. This implies that producer marginal 
profits remain intact by the introduction of the policy as the extra cost is 
transferred directly to the consumers.  
 
Before the new labeling policy is adopted, both informed and uninformed 
consumers have no other option but to buy the unlabelled product at a price 
P1. However, after the implementation of the policy, consumers have now to 
choose between buying the food miles labeled tomatoes at a price P2>P1 and 
refraining from purchasing tomatoes. Nevertheless, informed consumers do 
realize  the  shift  in  quality  while  the  only  observable  change  for  the 
uninformed consumers is the change in price. In other words, uninformed 
consumers think they are buying the same product as before (i.e., when it 
was unlabeled) with a non-sensible or even unnoticeable label that provides 
no contribution to their utility. According to Foster and Just (1989), this 
situation also encumbers the uninformed consumers with an additional cost 
known as the cost of ignorance. The cost of ignorance is the cost that is 
embodied to the uninformed consumers‟ choices due to the fact that their 
choice is based on limited or no information. 
 
Formally, according to Lusk and Marette (2010) the per choice change in 
consumer surplus or “anticipated benefit” (Leggett, 2002) associated with 
the implementation of the food miles labeling policy for the uninformed 
consumers corresponds to the average area on the left of the demand curve 
between the price change and is given by: 
 
(4)                
                                 
      
 
Where    is the sum of the marginal utilities derived from all other than 
price attributes of the unlabeled product, β is the marginal utility of price, P1 
and P2 are the prices before and after the implementation of the mandatory 
labeling policy, respectively, and    is a parameter that sets the utility level  
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of the no-choice alternative. However, as mentioned before, mandatory food 
miles  labeling  would  also  introduce  an  extra  cost  to  the  uninformed 
consumers; the cost of ignorance. This cost should be subtracted from (4) 
when estimating the total welfare effect of the examined policy. The cost of 
ignorance is given by:  
 
(5)                 
       
            
       
   
 
Where    is the same as    but for the labeled product. Note that since β is 
negative and P2>P1,               is expected to be also negative, thus 
appearing as an extra cost rather than benefit. The interpretation of this is 
that the uninformed consumers experience a welfare loss from mandatory 
FM labels, based on their incorrect beliefs about the quality of the product. 
On  the  other  hand,  taking  also  into  account  that           (the  marginal 
utility of both  labels  is  positive, see  table 2), (5) is  also  expected to  be 
negative, thus being an actual benefit instead of a cost (since it is subtracted 
from (4)). In other words, the implementation of the policy would “force” 
uninformed consumers to make decisions closer to those they would have 
made, had they received more information. As a consequence, the relative 
magnitude of these two figures will determine whether the adoption of the 
policy would have a positive or negative impact on uninformed consumers‟ 
welfare. 
 
For  informed  consumers,  the  notion  is  simpler  and  the  welfare  surplus 
change in every choice situation is given by: 
 
(6)              
                                 
   
 
Since we used the RPL model to estimate the parameters of our model, the 
welfare measures of (4), (5) and (6) could not be numerically calculated but 
could be estimated using a simulation approach. In our analysis, we use the 
Monte  Carlo  simulation  method  with  10,000  draws  from  a  multivariate 
normal distribution. 
 
In order to get the average per-choice welfare effect of the policy for all 
three  types  of  fresh  tomatoes  included  in  the  design,  we  consider  a  
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composite product (33.3% cherry and 33.3% plum and 33.3% brief) and the 
mean price of fresh tomatoes. The hypothetical nature of the product is not 
at all restrictive and enhances the usefulness of our results as they reflect the 
average welfare effect for the three types of fresh tomatoes. Accordingly, 
from this point on, the term “fresh tomato” will be used to refer to this 
composite product. In fact from table 2, one could notice that the parameters 
associated with the dummy variables for cherry and plum product attributes 
are only statistically significant at the 10% level. 
 
We  consider  a  situation  where  regardless  of  which  food  policy  is  being 
implemented,  consumers  have  three  choices:  organic  fresh  tomato, 
conventional  fresh  tomato,  and  none  of  these.  According  to  the  Italian 
Institute  of  Services  for  the  Agri-Food  Market  (ISMEA),  in  2009  the 
average price of fresh tomato was 1.73 €/kilo. Therefore, we set the price of 
conventional  fresh  tomato  at  1.16  €/kilo  (1.73  -  33%)  and  the  price  of 
organic fresh  tomato at 2.30 €/kilo  (1.73+33%). We use these values  to 
describe  the  prices  before  the  implementation  of  the  mandatory  labeling 
(P1).  
 
Furthermore, we assume that the food miles labels will raise the production 
costs and hence the average price of tomato by 20%. As a result, the prices 
after the policy is adopted (P2) are considered to be 20% higher than those 
before the implementation of the policy (P1). To assess the sensitivity of our 
results to this assumption, we test all possible increments on P1 from 1% to 
100% to find the level of the price increase that would reverse the sign of 
the welfare effect. 
5.  Results 
 
The RPL estimates are reported in table 2. Results suggest that the price 
effect  is  negative,  indicating  that  increases  on  the  price  variable  can 
decrease the associated utility level provided by the choice. The coefficient 
of constant β0 is also negative which suggests that the utility that consumers 
derive from having nothing at all (alternative C) is lower than the utility 
from buying one of the designed alternatives (A or B). All the other product 
attributes considered in the utility function exhibited positive mean value. 
Thus, our respondents on average prefer organic fresh tomato.  Both food 
miles information are also found to positively affect consumers‟ choices. 
Results also show that respondents slightly prefer cherry and plum tomatoes  
 
11 
over  brief  tomatoes.  The  standard  deviations  of  all  variable  coefficients 
reported in the last column of table 2 are statistically significant at the 0.01 
level, confirming the hypothesis of heterogeneity in the population in terms 
of  consumers‟ preferences for type of tomato, production method, and food 
miles information.  
 
The estimated welfare effects of a mandatory labeling policy, assuming a 
20% increment on the initial price of fresh tomatoes are presented in tables 
3  and  4.  The  results  indicate  that  for  both  food  miles  labels  (i.e.,  CO2 
emission and number of miles labels), a mandatory labeling policy would 
have  a  positive  effect  on  both  informed  and  uninformed  consumers.  
However, the number of miles (Nmiles) label has a greater positive impact 
on consumers‟ welfare than the CO2 label, which is expected considering 
that the Nmiles label added more to the utility of consumers, as indicated by 
the results of the RPL model. 
 
As  expected,  at  first,  uninformed  consumers  experience  a  negative 
anticipated  “benefit”  from  the  policy  scheme  for  both  examined  labels. 
However, this welfare loss is a result of their incorrect beliefs about the new 
product‟s quality since they have no understanding about the usefulness of 
that label in reducing the existing information  asymmetry in the market. 
Once  this  welfare  effect  is  calibrated  to  include  the  cost  of  ignorance 
(benefit in this case), it becomes positive and relatively high compared to 
the average price of the product considered. On the other hand, for informed 
consumers, the anticipated benefit  is  positive for both  labels  and greater 
than that of the uninformed consumers. Thus, a mandatory labeling scheme 
is preferable to the status quo (no labeling) in terms of consumers‟ welfare 
in both cases. For the CO2 label, the welfare effect of a mandatory labeling 
scheme is 0.45 €/choice for uninformed consumers and 0.54 €/choice for the 
informed ones, while for the Nmiles label the effects are 0.68 €/choice and 
0.79 €/choice for the uninformed and informed consumers, respectively.  
 
Since the above results could be an artifact of the assumption that prices 
would be 20% higher after the policy is implemented, we simulate different 
situations  where  the  hypothetical  increment  takes  on  values  from  1%  to 
100%. Column 4 of tables 3 and 4 present the highest possible increment on 
the  initial  price  for  which  the  welfare  effect  remains  positive.  The 
robustness of our findings is confirmed since for CO2 labels, uninformed  
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consumers could bear a 52% rise in price of fresh tomatoes and still have a 
welfare gain; for informed consumers the highest price for positive welfare 
effect would be 60% higher than the current price. On the other hand, for 
Nmiles  label  the  corresponding  percentages  are  67%  and  81%  for 
uninformed  and  informed  consumers,  respectively.    Hence,  the  positive 
welfare impact of the policy is relatively robust to different price increases 
as a result of the mandatory labeling policy. 
6.  Conclusions  
 
In  this  study,  we  assessed  the  welfare  effect  of  two  generic  food  miles 
labeling programs. In particular, we attempted to estimate the effect that a 
mandatory labeling policy would have on consumers‟ welfare. To achieve 
our objective we considered two extreme market situations: one in which 
consumers are fully aware of the change in product quality introduced by 
food  miles  labels  and  one  in  which  consumers  notice  no  difference  in 
product quality between labeled and unlabelled products. Using data from a 
choice experiment survey conducted in Italy, our results generally suggest 
that for both food miles labels, a mandatory labeling policy would have a 
positive effect on both informed and uninformed consumers.  This positive 
welfare effect is relatively robust to different levels of price increases of the 
product  after  the  implementation  of  the  mandatory  labeling  policy.  
Specifically, our results indicate that the Nmiles label  has a greater positive 
impact on consumers‟ welfare than the CO2 label. This finding is expected 
since as indicated by the results of the RPL model, consumers get a higher 
utility from number of miles label than from CO2 label.   
 
No other known study has evaluated the consumer welfare effects of food 
miles labels.  Our study fills this void.  However, in order to evaluate the 
overall usefulness of the mandatory labeling policy, one should take into 
account the extra costs associated with the implementation of the labeling 
policy scheme.  These costs could include those associated with monitoring 
procedures to make sure that the level of CO2 emission or number of miles 
reported on the label is accurate and the cost of restructuring the supply 
chain to comply with the new standards. Therefore, the costs involved in the 
implementation of the mandatory labeling policy should be compared to the 
welfare  benefits  before  any  decision  about  the  adoption  of  the  labeling 
policy should be made.  This comparison is beyond the scope of the current 
paper but would be a good topic for future research.  Lastly, since our study  
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is based on a choice experiment conducted in Italy, future research should 
use other types of WTP elicitation mechanisms as well as data collected in 
other geographic areas to test the robustness of our welfare estimates. 
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8.  Tables  
 
Table 1. Socio-demographic characteristics of the sample. (N = 200) 
Socio-demographic characteristic  % of total 
Gender   
Male  36.5% 
Female  63.5% 
Age Group   
18-24  20.5% 
25-40  28.5% 
41-54  26.0% 
55-64  15.5% 
Over 64  9.5% 
Marital status   
Single  36.5% 
Married  46.0% 
Widowed  4.5% 
Other   6.5% 
Educational level   
No formal education  16.0% 
Up to High school degree  (1-12 years)  48.5% 
More than 12  years and less than 16 
years 
16.0% 
Graduate from college (16 years)  18.5% 
More than 16 years (PhD, Masters)  1.0% 
Annual Income   
Euro 19,999 or less  37.5% 
Euro 20,000 – 39,999  36.0% 
Euro 40,000 – 59,000  18.0% 
Euro 60,000 – 79,000  7.0% 
Euro 80,000 – 99,000  0.5% 
More than Euro 100,000  1.0% 






Table 2.  RPL model estimates 
Attribute  Description  Mean   St.Dev 
No-buy  Dummy, 1 for  „none of the above‟ option, 0 otherwise  - 4.47***  1.81 
Price  Price of the product  1.35***  0 
CO2  Dummy, product bears a CO2 label  1.14***  1.89 
Nmiles  Dummy, product bears a Nmiles label  1.50***  1.83 
Organic  -1 for conventional production method , 1 for organic  1.52***  0.61 
Cherry  Dummy, product is a cherry tomato  0.50*  1.99 
Plum  Dummy, product is a plum tomato  0.36*  1.22 
*** Values statistically significant at 1% level. 
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